Berlin 1948-1949
A Divided City
By the spring of 1948
the ideological division of Europe into two rival camps was almost complete,
except in Germany and the two cities of Vienna and Berlin, where Britain,
France, the Soviet Union, and the United States each governed a separate
sector. The Potsdam Conference, which had divided Germany among the victorious
Big Four into four zones of military occupation, also divided the city of
Berlin. Agreements about free access to Berlin, which was deep within the Soviet
occupation zone, subsequently were formalized in September 1945, when the four
nations concurred on which road and rail lines would be used in supplying areas
of the city occupied by the Western Allies. Then, in October, the Allies agreed
to the establishment of air corridors across the Soviet zone between Berlin and
the Western sectors of Germany. For three years there was free movement along
the accepted routes of access to the city.
Berlin had suffered
round-the-clock bombing in the war, by the US Eighth Air Force during the day
and the Royal Air Force at night. The city also had suffered heavy bombardment
by the Red Army during the final battle. The destruction of Germany's once
great capital was almost total: whole districts had been flattened; entire
apartment blocks were demolished; almost every building in the city showed
signs of damage. Food was perpetually in short supply, and the official
currency, the reichsmark, gradually became worthless. The black market
flourished, and the cigarette became a form of currency in itself. Barter was
widespread for whatever goods could be found. The citizens of Berlin had,
literally, to dig in the rubble to scratch out a living.
Germany was the last
unanswered question between the United States and the Soviet Union. Throughout
the long negotiations of 1946 and 1947, the
Soviets had repeatedly
shown anxiety over a revivified Germany. The damage caused to the USSR by the
invasion and scorched-earth retreat of the Wehrmacht was so great that Russia
felt justified in demanding vast reparations from Germany. Where they could,
the Soviets dismantled factories they seized, almost brick by brick, machine by
machine, and transported the whole lot back by train to the USSR.
The Americans and the
British never put their faith in a policy of reparations. They knew what the
vast and punitive reparations demanded by France after the First World War had
done to keep the devastated German economy
from recovering and to
promote the climate in which Nazism was to flourish. Determined to prevent
conditions in which extremism might grow again in Germany, the Americans in
1947 wanted to see a revived Germany at the centre of a prosperous Europe.
Ernest Bevin, Britain's foreign secretary, had no love of Germany, but he
gradually accepted the West's need for that country's revival as a democratic
state built upon a strong industrial base, especially the iron and steel
industries in the Ruhr, which lay within the British zone of occupation.
In his Stuttgart
speech of 6 September 1946, James F. Byrnes, then still the US secretary of
state, had called for a higher level of industrial activity within Germany, for
monetary reform, and for preparations to form a German government. At the Big
Four meeting in Moscow in March-April 1947, the Western powers failed to agree
on any of these points with the Soviets. The USSR still demanded $10 billion in
reparations and joint control of the Ruhr industrial region.
Friction newly stirred
by the Marshall Plan put even greater strain on the situation in Germany. The
Council of Foreign Ministers met once more in London from 25 November to 15
December 1947. Again there were major disagreements over the same issues:
reparations, control over the industries of the Ruhr, and German unity. The
meeting ultimately broke up in accusation and counter-accusation. Secretary of
State Marshall summed up his conclusion during a broadcast to the American
people: "We cannot look forward to a reunified Germany at this time. We
must do our best in the area where our influence can be felt." If the
Americans could not get Soviet support for their
policy towards Germany, then they would go it alone in the Western zones.
In January 1948 the British cabinet discussed the situation. Bevin presented a
paper that argued for slow movement towards a West German government, and for
action on currency reform to undercut the rampant blackmarket. Bevin thought of
Britain as an intermediary between the French, who were still fearful of German
recovery, and the Americans, who were increasingly frustrated by what they saw
as French obstructionism. For the United States, questions of national security
were beginning to focus almost exclusively upon the Soviet Union. The French
were haunted by an ancient rivalry with Germany and bitter memories of recent
defeat and occupation.
On 23 February
representatives from the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg,
along with the United States, met in London to plan for the new West German
entity, and for the participation of Germany in the Marshall Plan. News of the
Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia added impetus to the urgency for creating
this new state.
As before, spies
within the Foreign Office in London passed reports to Soviet intelligence about
secret discussions at the London conference. On 12 March, Foreign Minister
Molotov was advised that the "Western powers are transforming Germany into
their strongpoint" and incorporating it into a "military-political
bloc" aimed at the Soviet Union. Molotov accused the Allies of violating
the agreements of Potsdam, and announced that decisions made at the London
conference were invalid.
The same intelligence
reports were passed on to Marshal Vassily Sokolovsky, the Soviet military
governor in Germany, who had been Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov's chief of staff
during the march on Berlin. To the American, French, and British military
delegations who met with their Soviet counterparts as the Allied Control
Council to govern Germany, Sokolovsky presented a cold, hard face. Among his
aides, however, he was known for his sense ofhumour. Sokolovsky's opposite number
on the American side wasGeneral Lucius D. Clay, the US military governor in
Germany. Clay appeared to his aides to have an endless capacity for work,
rarely stopping for lunch, which he considered a waste of time. He survived on
coffee and cigarettes, smoking several packs a day. With boundless confidence
in his own view of the situation, he had a certain impatience with his political
masters. George Kennan reported that he never noticed a "yearning for
guidance" on Clay'spart. By the summer of 1948 Clay was convinced of the
need to move ahead with a West German state, come what may. "If we mean
that we are to hold Europe against communism, we must not budge," he told
General Omar Bradley, the US Army chief of staff. He continued,"I believe
the future of democracy requires us to stay here until forced out."
At a routine Allied
Control Council meeting on 20 March 1948, Sokolovsky pressed Clay and his
British counterpart, General Sir Brian Robertson, for information about the
conference in London - already knowing, of course, exactly what had
happened:'When Clay stated that they were not going to discuss the London
meetings, Sokolovsky demanded to know what was the point of having a Control
Council. To the others' astonishment, the Soviets then got up and, in line
behind Sokolovsky, walked out of the meeting, effectively ending the council.
On 12 March, prior to
the Soviet walkout, Marshall had informed the British ambassador in Washington
that the United States was "prepared to proceed at once in the joint
discussions on the establishment of an Atlantic security system." Bevin's
dream of committing America to the defence of Europe, which had first been
encouraged by the offer of the Marshall Plan, was now becoming a reality, as
discussions began on what would become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
In mid-March, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed
the Brussels Defence Pact, which was the first step towards a West European
union. Militarily, it bound the signatories to come to each other's defence.
And they agreed to keep troops in Germany for a period of fifty years.
Petty Obstacles Grow
Meanwhile, around
Berlin, Soviet authorities began applying a range of petty bureaucratic
obstacles to the free movement of people and supplies in and out of the city.
Restrictions were placed on traffic using the autobahn between Berlin and the
British sector in the west. The bridge over the Elbe at Hohenwarte, the only
other road-crossing point, was closed for "maintenance." The British
offered to send engineers to build another bridge, but Sokolovsky turned down
the offer. The Soviets announced that they would search military passengers and
their cargo on the rail lines, and stated that no freight shipments between
Berlin and the Western zones could be made without Soviet permission. On 1
April the Soviets halted two American and two British trains after their
commanders refused access to Soviet inspectors. All this amounted to what was
later called the "mini-blockade." General Clay ordered a "baby
airlift" to fly into Berlin enough supplies for forty-five days.
On 5 April a Vickers
Viking of British European Airways took off from an airfield in West Germany on
a scheduled flight into RAF Gatow, one of the Allied air bases in West Berlin.
As it came into Berlin, in one of the agreed twenty-mile-wide air corridors,
the Viking was buzzed by a Soviet Yak-3 fighter plane. It was not the first
time this had happened. For a few days Soviet fighters had been carrying out
mock attacks on Allied planes flying into Berlin. But this time, as the British
transport plane took evasive action, it collided with the Yak fighter. Both
planes crashed to the ground, killing all ten people on the BEA plane and the
pilot of the Soviet fighter. The Soviets blamed the British for the collision,
and the British blamed the Soviet pilot. A joint investigation of the accident
broke down when the Soviets refused to allow German witnesses to testify. The
British and Soviets separately concluded that the mid-air collision was an
accident. But it made both sides more nervous.
With the situation in
Berlin now alarmingly tense, the confrontation between Soviets and the West
spilt over into Berlin's internal politics. The Berlin city council was the
scene of a fierce power struggle between the East German Communists and their
political foes, led by the Social Democrats. Ernst Reuter, a Social Democrat,
was the leader of the anti-Communist coalition in Berlin, and a powerful
orator. He and his family had been forced to flee Germany because of Hitler,
but returning in 1946, he hoped to help rebuild Germany as a democratic state.
His election in 1948 as mayor of Berlin (that is, of the whole city) was vetoed
by the Soviets. Now Reuter feared he would have to take flight again, from
another form of political dictatorship. Intimidation, blackmail, and kidnapping
characterized the tactics of the Soviet-backed East German Communists, whose
agents operated in both East and West Berlin. Communists and socialists came
together in a new party, Socialist Unity, led by Walter Ulbricht, Stalin's man
in East Germany.
The London conference
on Germany reconvened again in late April and sat through May. The British and
Americans tried once more to persuade the French to agree to their plan for
integrating West Germany into Western Europe, and eventually the French and the
Benelux countries gave in. On 7 June 1948 the London conference issued its
final recommendations. The Western powers authorized the presidents of the
German Lander, the provincial assemblies, to convene a constituent assembly in
the three Western zones and to draw up a constitution for a federal German
state. Western military forces would remain in Germany until "the peace of
Europe is secure," and prohibitions were imposed on any future German army
to guarantee that Germany could never again become an aggressor. The new West
German state would be economically integrated into Western Europe. Whatever
the Soviet reaction, the Western nations made it clear, they intended to go
ahead.
The Americans and the
British, meanwhile, were secretly preparing to launch a new currency for the
whole of West Germany. In the chaotic German economy, only the black market was
thriving. Replacing the reichsmark would not only wipe out the accumulated
profits of black marketeers, it would complete the integration of Germany into
the West. Millions of new bank notes, the Deutschmark, were printed by the US
Mint and transported in great secrecy to West Germany. Control of currency was
power in Germany at this juncture, and the Western commanders decided that now
was the time for the West to exert its power.
Around Berlin tensions
had worsened. Soviet military authorities threatened to close down rail
traffic with the West. By 15 June canal boats and freight trains were the only
means left of supplying the city. In this explosive situation, the Western
Allies decided to introduce their new currency, which was announced on 18 June.
West German citizens could do nothing about the devaluation of their savings
and pensions, but at least the new currency brought hope of some stability
against runaway inflation. Sixty old reichsmarks, which would barely buy a
pack of black-market cigarettes, could be exchanged for forty new Deutschmarks.
To hold down their "currency" value while the new Deutschmark
established itself, the Americans wisely imported 20 million cigarettes.
The Soviet military
governor, Sokolovsky, immediately issued a proclamation denouncing the new
currency as "against the wishes and interests of the German people and in
the interests of the American, British, and French monopolists.... The separate
currency reform completes the splitting of Germany. It is a breach of the
Potsdam decisions." He prohibited the introduction of the new currency
into the Soviet zone and into Berlin.
The Frontiers Are Sealed
On that same day
Soviet authorities sealed off frontiers with the Western zones and announced
new restrictions on road, rail, and canal traffic that would come into effect
at midnight. General Clay assured his staff that he was not concerned by these
developments: "If they had put in a currency reform and we didn't, it
would have been [our] first move."
Late on 22 June the
Soviet military authorities announced that a new currency, the Ostmark, would
be introduced into the Eastern zone, including all of Berlin, in two days'
time. The Western military commanders then declared the Soviet order null and
void for West Berlin and introduced the B-mark, a special Deutschmark
overprinted with the letter B, for the Western sectors of Berlin. Clay, who
made the decision without consulting Washington, insisted it was a
"technical, non-political measure." But Sokolovsky announced that the
Western mark would not be permitted to circulate in Berlin, "which lies in
the Soviet zone of Germany and economically forms part of the Soviet
zone."
Over the next twelve
hours, Berlin endured an extraordinary midsummer nightmare. On the evening of
23 June, at a meeting of the Berlin city assembly, which was located in the
Soviet sector of the city, Reuter tried to persuade the assembly to approve the
circulation of both the Deutschmark and the Ostmark. As thugs beat up
non-Communists to intimidate them from supporting Reuter's motion, Soviet
officials and Communist-controlled police stood by and watched. Nevertheless,
the Berlin assembly voted to accept the Deutschmark in the Western sectors and
the Ostmark in the Soviet sector.
Sokolovsky rang
Molotov to ask what he should do; should he surround Berlin with tanks? Molotov
told him no, this might provoke the West into doing the same, and then the only
way out would be military confrontation. They decided instead to impose an
immediate blockade around Berlin, and at
In London and
Washington there was firm political agreement that the Western powers would
hold on to Berlin. "We are going to stay, period," said Truman. Bevin
was equally determined, announcing that "the abandonment of Berlin would
mean the loss of Western Europe." It was easy to make such statements, but
much more difficult to decide what to do next.
West Berlin had
symbolic status as an outpost of the democratic West inside the Communist East.
By an agreement made at the time of Potsdam, the Soviets had excused themselves
from the responsibility of supplying the British, American, and French sectors
of the city. So 2.3 million Berliners, and the Allied military garrison there,
were now cut off. The Western part of the city relied upon the arrival of
12,000 tons of supplies each day. At the time, there was only enough food for
thirty-six days, and enough coal for forty-five. The key to keeping a Western
presence in Berlin clearly lay in finding a way to supply the citizens with
their basic necessities. With rail, road, and canal routes blocked, the only
way to get supplies in was by air. But the American C-47 transport, the
military workhorse of the day, could only deliver a payload of 3 tons.
Initially the prospect for an airlift to Berlin appeared to be bleak.
On 24 June the West
introduced a counter-blockade, stopping all rail traffic into East Germany
from the British and US zones. Over the following months this counter-blockade
would have a damaging impact on East Germany, as the drying up of coal and
steel shipments seriously hindered industrial development in the Soviet zone.
On that same day
General Clay rang General Curtis LeMay of the US Air Force in Wiesbaden and
asked him to put on standby his fleet of C-47s and any other aircraft that
could be utilized. The RAF had come forward with an optimistic plan to supply
Berlin by air, but Clay was sceptical. He favoured sending a convoy of US
military engineers down the autobahn to force their way through the Soviet
blockade, with instructions to fire back if they were fired upon. But in
Washington, Truman's advisers urged caution and restraint. The president was
backed into a corner. It was an election year; the American people would never
support going to war with the Soviet Union just to defend Berlin, the capital
of a country they had been at war with only three years earlier. But Truman
had to be seen championing a firm line and not being soft on the Soviets. He
made no final decision that day, but Clay was told by telephone that the
president did not "want any action taken in Berlin which might lead to
possible armed conflict."
During this week, by
chance, General Albert Wedemeyer was visiting Europe from America. He had
helped direct the airlift to China over the "hump" from India during
the war. By his own calculations, he concluded that it was possible to supply
all of Berlin's needs by air. Although both the British and Americans had
experience with major air supply operations, neither had ever attempted
anything on this scale. Clay warned Reuter that to begin with there would be
severe shortages and hardship; he did not believe initially the Allies could
fly in more than 500 tons a day. Reuter assured him that the Allies could count
on the West Berliners to grin and bear it. Then, without consulting Washington,
Clay authorized the start of the airlift.
The Airlift Begins
On 26 June the first
American transport planes flew into Berlin from air bases in West Germany. The
Americans code-named the airlift Operation Vittles, and the British called it
Operation Plainfare. Initially about eighty C-47s flew two daily round trips
into RAF Gatow and Tempelhof, air bases in the British and American sectors of
Berlin. Soon the Americans were adding fifty C-54 Skymasters, four-engined
transports that each could bring in 9 tons, three times the payload of C-47s.
The Allies organized willing gangs of workers to unload the aircraft and turn
them around quickly. Over time these workers learned to empty each plane in
just seven minutes. The citizens of Berlin were optimistic that the Allies
would be able to save their city. If they had had little problem delivering
bombs, they told each other, they certainly could deliver potatoes.
The Royal Air Force
had nothing like enough service aircraft available for the operation, and spare
planes of any type were soon pressed into the airlift. British business executive Freddie Laker had
begun to buy and sell aircraft parts after the war, and by 1948 he owned twelve
converted Halifax bombers. He was asked to make them available for supplying Berlin.
With little expectation that the blockade would last more than a few weeks,
Laker and his team of pilots and engineers happily went to it, almost as a game
to begin with. But as the months passed, the operation grew for the pilots into
a crusade for freedom. They were determined to keep Berlin alive, despite the
hazards of flying old, rickety aircraft, often buzzed by Soviet fighters and
frequently at risk flying heavy loads in bad weather.
Bevin set up a
crisis-management team in London to supervise this herculean effort, and early
expectations were soon exceeded, as roughly 1,000 tons per day were flown into
the beleaguered city. The irony was not lost on many of the veteran fliers
involved; instead of destroying Berlin, they were now keeping the city alive.
In July, General Clay
returned to Washington for talks with Truman. He still favoured a military
convoy to break the blockade, for he believed that the Soviets would step back
rather than risk confronting the West. But Truman did not want to chance it. If
they chose not to let Clay's convoy through, there would be war. Instead Truman
guaranteed Clay more C-54s, and they talked of doubling the airlift to 2,000
tons daily.
The American
intelligence community, knowing that the Soviets still had 2.5 million men at
arms, was convinced that in a conventional military confrontation the Red Army
would walk right over the US forces. But they were equally confident that the
Kremlin would never sanction direct military conflict with the West, which might
provoke the Americans to take advantage of their atom bomb monopoly. And at
this crucial time the Soviet Union was further weakened by a crisis in its own
back yard. Yugoslavia split away from the Eastern camp, a defection that made
the Kremlin even more nervous about its position and anxious about the support
of its satellites.
During July 1948
attempts were made through diplomatic channels to bring about a settlement of
the Berlin crisis. On 2 August the British, American, and French ambassadors had
a private meeting with Stalin to test his willingness to find a peaceful
solution. Stalin made it clear that from the Soviet point of view the currency
question was crucial, as was the London agreement to create a united West
Germany. He argued that if there were two German states then Berlin was no
longer the capital of Germany, and hence the Western presence in the city was
no longer relevant. Stalin said the Soviet Union was not seeking conflict with
the West and would lift the blockade as soon as the West withdrew the B-mark
from West Berlin and agreed to fourpower rule over Germany. There was in fact
little the Soviets could do in the face of the West's superiority in the air
and its determination to keep up the airlift. What became clear to the Western
ambassadors was that the Soviet blockade of Berlin had but one principal
purpose: to prevent the creation of a West German state.
Throughout the summer
of 1948 the British and American governments constantly reviewed their options.
Military thinking concluded that the airlift could hardly continue through the
winter, that October was to be the cutoff point. The British chiefs of staff
prepared a contingency plan to withdraw their troops to the Rhine in case of an
emergency. In Washington the air force commanders, convinced that the airlift
was doomed to fail, concluded that there was a high likelihood of war with the
Soviets over Berlin.
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"We Are Not Pawns"
The Communist Party in
Yugoslavia came to power at the end of the Second World War without Soviet help,
unlike what happened in the other East European states. Marshal Josip Broz
Tito, the charismatic partisan leader, took power on his own initiative, and
through sheer force of character held together the fragile union of the
Yugoslav provinces, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and then
BosniaHerzegovina. Tito did all he could to exhibit his loyalty to the
socialist cause, but there was tension in his relationship with Moscow from the
start. Tito was secure at home, internationally renowned, and too
independent-minded to suit Stalin.
The Kremlin dictator
expected nothing less than total obedience from his satellites. But for Tito,
Yugoslavia had earned the right to determine its own destiny. In foreign
affairs Belgrade insisted on following its own line and did not seek advance
approval from Moscow. During the Greek civil war, for instance, Tito provided
military assistance to the Communist guerrillas despite Stalin's unwillingness
to get involved. But on other matters, as in Its rejection of the Marshall
Plan, Yugoslavia was a staunch supporter of Moscow's line. Through the early
months of 1948, as the split grew worse, Moscow accused Belgrade of misbehaviour
and of ideological deviation from the true socialist cause. Every denial by the
Yugoslavs further enraged the Kremlin. Tito refused to give way, saying in
March, "We are not pawns on a chessboard."
Then, on 28 June, only
four days after launching the blockade against Berlin, Moscow expelled
Yugoslavia from Cominform and called on other Communist parties to isolate
Tito.'
An economic blockade
was organized against Yugoslavia that caused great hardship, but Belgrade stood
firm. Rejected by the East, Tito over the next twelve months turned slowly, and
a little reluctantly, towards the West Following a disastrous harvest in 1949,
a trade agreement was signed with the United States by which Yugoslavia opened
its borders. Although not technically a member of the Marshall Plan, Yugoslavia
went on to receive about $150 million in aid from the United States. Throughout
the Cold War, Yugoslavia would remain the only independent Communist state in
Europe.
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The Threat of Nuclear Retaliation
The question arose as
to whether the United States would be willing to use atomic weapons in the
developing crisis, for there was still no clear policy within the
administration. Truman argued with his Pentagon chiefs that because they were
"so terribly destructive," atomic weapons could not be treated as
conventional weaponry. He urged the leaders "to understand that this isn't
a military weapon. It is used to wipe out women and children and unarmed
people." In September the National Security Council produced a secret
report designated as
In a dramatic gesture
that summer, a fleet of sixty B-29 Superfortress bombers was flown into the
United Kingdom. These were the latest American heavy bombers, designed to carry
atomic weapons. The deployment of the B-29s established the US Strategic Air
Command in the UK, and the arrival in Britain of "the atomic bombers"
was widely publicized. The threat of nuclear retaliation was now made explicit.
After a brief debate, at the height of the Berlin crisis, the British
government had formally invited Washington to station the bombers in Britain.
The invitation neatly fudged the issue as to who would have his finger on the
nuclear trigger; the US Air Force bombers would respond to orders from the
United States, but their bases would be technically under the command of the
Royal Air Force. This theoretical ambivalence lasted for more than forty years.
But in practice the real decision, if it ever came to that, would always be
made as
The planes in fact
carried no atomic weapons, but this was a closely guarded secret. There were
not enough atomic warheads in existence to equip the B-29s in Britain. Their
arrival was mainly a signal to Moscow that the West meant business over Berlin,
and Washington took advantage of the crisis to get congressional approval for
permanent overseas military bases. The British government knew that the B-29s
carried no atomic weapons, and through spies in the London Foreign Office,
Moscow probably also knew the reality of the situation.
Meanwhile, the Berlin
airlift was proving more successful than anyone ever expected. Tens of
thousands of Berliners helped build a new airport at Tegel to reduce congestion
at the other two airfields. With capacity for more flights, the Americans added
another sixty C-54s to their fleet. Clay now spoke of bringing in 4,500 tons each
day. On 18 September, 861 British and American flights delivered a record 7,000
tons in a single day. By this date roughly 200,000 tons of supplies had been
delivered, about 60 per cent by the USAF and 40 per cent by the RAF. Coal,
flour, drums of petrol, potatoes, medical
Berlin, 1948-1949
supplies, all were
brought in by air. It began to look as if the airlift could after all supply
the city on through the winter, which everyone prayed would not be severe;
there were no reserves of coal.
Inside West Berlin,
electricity was available only four hours a day. People got used to the limited
rations and to feeling cold. The blockade in any case was not absolute. Many
West Berliners registered for food rations with the Soviet authorities, and
about one in ten drew food and coal from the east. There was no restriction on
travel within the city. West Berliners regularly visited the eastern part of
the city, where there were dance halls bathed in electric light drawing and
properly heated, a magnetic attraction to the hungry citizens of the west.
West Berliners were
still fearful that the West might not continue the air lift. On 6 September
another meeting of the city assembly in East Berlin was broken up by Communist
activists - again with violence and intimidation.
The western
representatives decided that the council was no longer function
al, so they left and
agreed to meet in the safety of West Berlin. Ernst Reuter
appealed to all
Berliners to help condemn the Communists, and three days
later a huge gathering
of 300,000 Berliners, mostly from the city's western
zones, collected
outside the ruins of the Reichstag. In front of the vast crowd
Reuter, standing on a
pile of war rubble, called on the Western governments
not to abandon Berlin.
The airlift became almost
a way of life. Although expensive, its cost represented only a fraction of
total American aid to Europe. Despite bad weather and constant harassment by
Soviet fighters, the transports continued to bring their cargoes into West
Berlin. By December 1948 the goal of 4,500 tons flown in each day was reached.
At Gatow and Tempelhof flights landed every 90 seconds. Enough coal was
freighted in to keep West Berliners from freezing. The
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A new game,
'Airlift." broken up by Communist activists - again with violence and
intimidation. The western representatives decided that the council was no
longer functional, so they left and agreed to meet in the safety of West
Berlin. Ernst Reuter appealed to all Berliners to help condemn the Communists,
and three days later a huge gathering of 300,000 Berliners, mostly from the
city's western zones, collected outside the ruins of the Reichstag. In front of
the vast crowd Reuter, standing on a pile of war rubble, called on the Western
governments not to abandon Berlin.
The airlift became almost a way of life. Although expensive, its cost represented only a fraction of total American aid to Europe. Despite bad weather and constant harassment by Soviet fighters, the transports continued to bring their cargoes into West Berlin. By December 1948 the goal of 4,500 tons flown in each day was reached. At Gatow and Templehof flights landed every 90 seconds. Enough coal was freighted in to depp West Berliners from freezing. The gamble had paid off. Production in the city picked up, and output grew rapidly. The feared economic collapse did not materialize. And the winter, fortunately, was unusually mild.
The West secured a
major propaganda victory through the airlift. It was a reminder to the Soviet
Union, and the whole world, of Western technological superiority, especially
in the air. Conversely, the Berlin crisis showed the Soviets in a poor light;
they seemed willing to threaten 2 million people with starvation.
The Soviets, operating
outside the framework of American loan credits and facing the Western alliance,
saw themselves to be increasingly threatened. We now know that Stalin felt
less strong than was realized at the time, but in 1948 many Americans genuinely
believed that Stalin sought to dominate all of Europe. The policy of
containment meant confronting Communists at agreed critical points, and Berlin
was one of these. As far as Western public opinion was concerned, old wartime
loyalties to Russia were being replaced by fear of Soviet ambitions; a "them
and us" syndrome had emerged. Marshall reported, "There has been a
definite crystallization of American public and Congressional opinion over the
Berlin issue.... The country is more unified in its determination not to weaken
in the face of pressure of an illegal blockade than on any other issue we can
recall in time of peace." The Berlin blockade made clear to most Americans
that the new enemy was definitely the Soviet Union.
As the heavy
transports continued to fly their daily missions, the constitution of the
Federal Republic of Germany, popularly known as West Germany, was being
drafted. Stalin's attempt to prevent the division of Germany had failed.
NATO Is Launched
In January 1949
President Truman announced his intention to provide military aid to Western
Europe. Then, in April, negotiations lasting more than a year finally came to
their conclusion when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by the
United States, Canada, and ten West European governments. All signatories
agreed to come to the aid of each other if attacked. A common cause was
formally recognized, and American leadership of the West was duly confirmed.
Ernest Bevin's mission to commit the United States to the defence of Western
Europe by treaty obligation was accomplished. Stalin had driven the West into a
formal alliance based primarily on mutual defence against Soviet aggression.
In the spring of 1949
the weather improved considerably. Food supplies in Berlin could be built up
and fuel stocks maintained at a good level. The airlift increased to 8,000 tons
per day. In one twenty-four-hour period, on Easter Sunday, April 1949, a record
number of 1,398 flights came into Berlin, carrying a total of 13,000 tons of
supplies.
As the
counter-blockade of East Germany hurt more and more, the Soviets took the only
course left open and tried to end the whole Berlin debacle. The Kremlin
released a series of hints that it would consider ending its blockade with
minimal conditions imposed. The counter-blockade would have to be lifted and
the Council of Foreign Ministers be reconvened. The bellicose General Clay
quietly returned to Washington and ceased to be military governor. After the
tensions of the preceding year he claimed to need a break anyway. On 12 May the
Soviet and Western military authorities lifted their respective blockades
around Berlin. Both sides claimed a victory. Berliners were jubilant. Many
thought this would be the end of the Cold War.
The sense of victory
and relief felt in the West did not last long. Before summer was over an
American B-29, on routine patrol at 18,000 feet over the North Pacific, picked
up a radioactivity count higher than normal. Within a week more radiation was
detected. Soviet scientists, led by Igor Kurchatov, had successfully tested an atom
bomb. The Soviet Union had caught up. The Americans were stunned, for now there
was nuclear parity between the superpowers. The balance of power would become
a balance of terror.
12 May 1949. The first
British
truck passes the
checkpoint on the British-Russian zonal border as jubilant Germans look on. The
airlift has succeeded. The blockade is lifted.