[Abstract: The article attempts to read Kant's Critique of Judgment through the eyes of early German romanticism, principally Friedrich Schlegel, often considered the theoretician of the movement. After a brief look at Schlegel's views regarding Kant's critical philosophy, the author turns to the Third Critique itself and Kant's thoughts on aesthetics, of particular interest to the romantics. Aesthetics for Kant has to do with the feeling of delight regarding the beautiful and the sublime, whether in art or in nature. After considering the role of the teleological judgment relative to artistic and natural beauty, the author turns to the issue of the avowed purpose of the Third Critique, namely to provide a bridge between the First and Second Critiques. Unable to establish such a bridge between the theoretical and practical reasons through the aesthetic and teleological judgments, Kant, in the end, attempts to bridge the gap with human consciousness itself. This effort, in the author's view, proves unsuccessful. The article concludes with a brief comparison between Kant's anthropology and that of Fichte, upon whom Schlegel largely depends.]

Within ten years of the publication of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment, the mantel of chief German philosopher had dropped from the shoulders of the Sage of Königsberg to be donned by a young upstart from Jena, J. G. Fichte, at least so far as the early German romantics were concerned. In his Athenäumfragment #216, Friedrich Schlegel states that the three trend-setting events (Tendenzen) of the age are the French Revolution, Fichte's philosophy, and Goethe's Meister. (The last-mentioned is Goethe's 1796 novel Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre about a young man in search of himself.) Conspicuous by its absence is any mention of Kant.

Which is not to say that Schlegel does not admire Kant. In #220 of his fragments, published in the Athenaeum, the literary organ of the early German romantics, he remarks that Kant, the Copernicus of philosophy, has a more syncretistic spirit and critical wit than Leibniz, though he appears less so. The same thing, he adds, has happened to Kant's ideas as to popular songs—the Kantians have sung them to death; so that it is easy, if unfair, to imagine him as less witty than he really is. "Wit" was highly prized by the romantics. Someone witzig was knowledgeable (Cf. wissen, behind which lies List, lernen) and learned. A witty person was ingenious and perceptive, able to get to the point and make connections quickly.

One might have thought that the lengthy section on aesthetics in the Critique of Judgment would have appealed to the romantics. However, the style of the work, with its long periodic sentences, technical jargon, and subtle argument, would have counted against it. Kant does use some of the buzz words that will later become part and parcel of romantic vocabulary, Sehnsucht
(once, in a footnote), Gefühl, Einbildungskraft; however, these terms do not have the resonance they will gain after Fichte. Further, while Schlegel agrees that Kant’s view of aesthetic taste as “disinterested delight” (ohne alles Interesse) is, indeed, characteristic of classical Greek poetry, as also of the pseudo-classicism of the previous age, he would hardly have considered this as in any way approximating the artistic ideal. Such a view of poetry would deny the imaginative, the ironic, the very subjectivity of the artist. As Schlegel says in Athenäumfragment #322, Kant discovered something significant, even if he did not know entirely what to make of it. What Kant had discovered was subjectivity, the implications of which philosophical insight Fichte will draw out from Kant for the benefit of the romantics.

On the other hand, Schlegel insists that Fichte most certainly knows what to make of Kant’s insight. Still, in Athenäumfragment #281, he maintains that if one remains focused on the thrust of Fichte’s thought one will see that it is one with that of Kant. Indeed, he argues, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre represents the content of the Kantian philosophy if not precisely its form, which form Fichte knows well, even if he does not spell it out. Fichte, Schlegel says, is Kant raised to the second power. Fichte’s version of the theory of knowledge is far more critical than it appears, and is both philosophy and the philosophy of philosophy. In Fichte, philosophy becomes a second order discipline. The reason for picking Schlegel as the spokesperson for romanticism is that, for all intents and purposes, he represents the theoretician of the movement.

Schlegel is convinced that the critical philosophy would have occurred in Germany with or without Kant (Athenäumfragment #378). Nevertheless, he finds Kant’s critical philosophy overly negative. In Athenäumfragment #3, he says, “Kant introduced the concept of the negative into philosophy. Wouldn’t it be worthwhile trying now to introduce the concept of the positive into philosophy as well?” Thus, while Schlegel insists that one can never be too critical (Athenäumfragment #281), it is necessary to move beyond the purely negative.

The Critique of Judgment

In the preface to the Critique of Judgment, Kant notes that this will be the last of the critiques. After all, Kant did not publish Versuch einer Kritik der Offenbarung in 1792. That was Fichte, even if some initially thought that the work was authored by Kant. In his first two critiques, Kant had distinguished sharply between the speculative and practical reasons and their respective grounds in the realms of the phenomenal and the noumenal. Thus, early on in the Critique of Judgment, Kant notes that it is impossible to see beyond the gulf or chasm (Kluft) between the sensible realm of nature and the supersensible realm of freedom; and reason will not provide a bridge between the two different worlds. Still, given the fact that the notion of freedom is meant to actualize its laws in the sensible world, one must think of nature as functioning in harmony with these laws. (I have italicized the operative word “think” in this context since, according to Kant, the idea of any tie between the two cannot, strictly speaking, be known; but it can be thought. For Kant there is no intellectual intuition, at least not for human beings.) Still, despite his diffidence regarding the
possibility of establishing such a link, in the *Critique of Judgment* Kant nonetheless attempts to bridge the chasm between the two worlds.

In fact, Kant proposes several bridges: teleology in biology and in morality, religion, art, and, perhaps, human consciousness. The romantics were particularly interested in religion and art; indeed, they tended to join them together in their thinking. As Schlegel notes in *Athenäumfragment* #81, every human relating to the Infinite is religion; and this is as thoroughly the case with the true artist as it is with the human being relative to his or her ideal (*Athenäumfragment* #406). Though in a footnote (KU, pp. 615-616 n), Kant speaks of beauty as a sort of religious feeling (*Gefühl*), his normal tendency is to join the artistic and the ethical. At the end of the section on the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, he says that taste is basically the capacity for judging the sensible instantiation of moral or ethical ideas (KU, p. 465). Indeed, the *Critique of Judgment* ends up pretty much where it begins, namely with the second critique and the primacy of practical reason. It is not a position designed to appeal to romantics such as Schlegel. Indeed, there is a categorical imperative for Schlegel—it is intellectual intuition (*Athenäumfragment* #76). However, this was a move that Kant had already proscribed. There is sensible intuition. Intellectual intuition, the insight into things in themselves or things as they are in themselves, is reserved to God and angels.

Aesthetic Judgment

For Kant aesthetics and the power of judgment has to do with the feeling of pleasure, or displeasure, relative to the beautiful or the sublime, whether in the work of art or in nature. As such, it is a capacity somewhere between that of cognition (truth) and that of desire (good), and would thus be able to act as a bridge between the two (KU, p. 238-239). It represents a reflecting/reflective power of judging (KU, pp. 251-253), a subjective principle somewhat like that of seeing purpose in nature (KU, p. 257). Such a representation of purpose is an aesthetic one, and also subjective. The subject really wants (*Gefühle der Lust*) to believe that there is purposefulness there (KU, p. 264). However, there is no concept (of the understanding, *Begriff*) involved in such a judgment as there is in the case of the understanding’s knowledge of objects (KU, pp. 265-268). Kant’s use of the word object in this context is misleading, since such an “object” is always an object of knowledge. Nature, as Kant indicates in the initial draft of the introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, is the collectivity of all the objects of experience (KU, p. 185, italics mine). The judgment of taste, relative to the sublime, is likewise a feeling arising from the mind (*Geistesgefühl entsprungenes*), since form is involved (KU, p. 267). The capacity for judgment is for Kant, then, a special one, since it represents a mediating concept between the concept of nature and that of freedom (KU, pp. 269-272). And the freedom involved in aesthetic judgment, as it mediates between nature (understanding) and freedom (reason) is also peculiar, since, after all, it is tied to both the empirical and the moral.

It may be well to return to Kant’s view regarding the judgment of taste as the delight (*Wohlgefallen*) *ohne alles Interesse* (KU, pp. 280-281), since it is an issue crucial to the lack of acceptance of Kant’s aesthetics on the part of the
romantics. Now while the Latin *interesse* can mean “differ” or “be different,” the *ohne alles Interesse* certainly does not mean being indifferent toward the work of art or an object of beauty. The Latin can also mean “to be apart,” and thus connote the requisite aesthetic distance between the viewer and the object of beauty viewed, something to which Kant refers especially in relation to the sublime. However, *pretium* (price) is also attached to the meaning of *interesse*. Kant later speaks of the beautiful or sublime as a good, as something treasured (*geschätzt*, KU, p. 287). I think what Kant is getting at with the phrase is, first of all, that the beautiful, above all the sublime, is beyond the purely utilitarian. Indeed, the beautiful sunset (given the pollution which is a contributing factor) is not particularly useful at all. But he is also saying that for the appreciation of the beautiful or the sublime one does not need to own it. One could hardly own a beautiful sunset. And there are beautiful objects that are, literally, priceless. One would not really want to own Chartres Cathedral. The upkeep would be horrendous. Similarly, one need not own the Monet painting to delight in it. The insurance, let alone the painting, would likely be beyond one’s means. By the same token, one need not “possess” Ms. East Prussia to appreciate her beauty.

Something else the *ohne Interesse* principle is meant to counter is, I think, the subjectivity inherent in Kant’s philosophy. While, on the one hand, he wants to insist that the judgment of taste is based upon subjective grounds (KU, p. 308), on the other hand, he also wishes to say that beauty is not just what I may consider beautiful (*für mich*), but what is beautiful for everyone (*jedermann*). There is here a common objective value (*Gemeingültigkeit*, KU, pp. 290, 292). Judgments of taste are not merely subjective (KU, p. 377). Similarly, while he insists that the beautiful is what is universally pleasing, but without a concept (KU, p. 298), he very much emphasizes the element of form in art, as in classical form. Thus, when it comes to landscape architecture (*Gartenkunst*), Kant would be more interested in the formal garden than in the studied spontaneity of the “English Garden” favored by the romantics. Indeed, Kant emphasizes the element of form in art to such an extent that he would seem to prefer dispensing with color, viewing it as a distraction from contemplation of the form (KU, p. 305).

Further, while Kant ties together the teleological in nature with that in art, he is also very careful to distinguish between the two. The landscape architect is more interested in the layout (form) than he is in the organic side of nature (KU, p. 305). Similarly, the beauty of the rose is not botanical. That the rose’s natural end is for reproduction (or pollination) is not averted to (*ohne Vorstellung eines Zweck*, KU, p. 319). In the appreciation of the beauty of Ms. East Prussia, one lays aside the fact that the natural purpose of that beauty is to attract a mate. However, there would be no Ms. Universe pageants in Kant’s world. The norm of beauty for men or women differs from culture to culture, like that between different species of horses and dogs (KU, p. 317).

The principal organ or faculty for the romantics is the imagination. The romantics draw their understanding of the imagination more from Fichte than from Kant. For Fichte the imagination is a faculty that swings (*schwebt*) between the shifting boundaries of the self and the non-self, the finite self and the infinite or ideal self.⁹ An investigation of the nature and role of the imagination in Kant’s
critical philosophy, above all the transcendental imagination, would take us too far a field. Suffice it to say that in Kant’s aesthetics the imagination plays a significant, though highly controlled, role. On the one hand, he has to allow the imagination’s freedom, while, on the other, he wants to insist that it is a law-based activity (freie Gesetzmässigkeit, KU, p. 324). Thus, he will say that the judgment of taste is a representation not subsumed under a concept but under the imagination, schematized therein without the aid of a concept, and under the aegis of freedom (KU, p. 381). However, while he may approve of a certain amount of enthusiasm—the idea of the good with feeling (Affekt, KU, p. 362)—this should not be allowed to degenerate into a gushy fantasizing (Schwärmerei) that verges on craziness (Wahn, KU, pp 362, 366). There are, after all, classical rules for beauty (KU, p. 378). What Kant gives with one hand he invariably takes back with the other. Thus, while the appreciation of beauty or the sublime is subjective, since it is individually experienced, it is also objective, an object for everyone (KU, p. 383). He insists that it is necessary to look beyond the sensible for what is behind taste so that it is not just as matter of De gustibus (KU, p. 446). Again, in his emphasis upon the objective, he goes to the extent of positing a “common sense” of an aesthetic sort (KU, p. 391). Further, while the work of art must have spirit (Geist, KU, p. 413), it must also avoid preciousness (Mannerism, KU, p. 420).

Kant again returns to the issue of the aesthetic judgment as subsumed under a concept. Earlier he had concluded that it is not a concept. Later on, however, he says that the aesthetic judgment does come under a concept, just not under a determinate concept. Rather, it is grounded under an indeterminate one. And the “concept” under which it would be subsumed would be the indeterminate idea of the supersensible in us (KU, p. 446). This “supersensible reality” is the intelligible substrate of nature outside us and within us (“intelligible Substrat der Natur ausser uns und in uns,” KU, p. 451). The fact that it is outside us would insue that aesthetic judgments have a definite objectivity. It is not simply a matter of personal taste. That it is within us would point to its ultimately apriori character. Kant adds that beyond this one cannot go (nichts weiter begreiflich gemacht werden, KU, p. 446). Regarding the supersensible cause, however, he cautions against the danger of drifting off into poetical exuberance (KU, p. 529). Kant clearly resists any such temptation.

In the end, Kant reverts to the position he had taken in the opening lines of the Conclusion to The Critique of Practical Reason, marveling at the starry skies above and the moral law within; though he grants that meditation upon such marvels can lead the mind astray—the starry skies into astrology, the moral law within to enthusiasm and superstition. What I think Kant is getting at here is that considering the sublime in a beautiful sunset could lead one to consider its source in God. When it comes to the “intelligible substrate” relative to the work of art, however, Kant’s aesthetics will have to await the theorizing of the romantic philosopher Schelling, who will see the work of the artist as an imaging of the Infinite in the finite.10

As noted earlier, at the end of the section on the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, Kant says that taste is basically the capacity for judging the sensible
instantiation of moral or ethical ideas (KU V, 465). Now while there is clearly an analogy between the aesthetic and the ethical, Kant must also point out the differences. Beauty, he says, pleases immediately, and ohne alles Interesse, unlike the moral good. What is moral is general and valid for all, since ethics is grounded in universalizable maxims (KU p. 462); while the representation involved in the judgment of taste is singular (Einzelnheit der Vorstellung, KU, p. 446). Still, the basis for the analogy between the two remains in virtue of the supersensible reality of the intelligible substrate. Nonetheless, it remains an indeterminate idea which can only be thought—indeed, for ethics must be thought—even if it cannot, strictly speaking, be known.

Teleological Judgment

When Kant comes to the Critique of Teleological Judgment, one must recall the stricture already laid down by Descartes: “we reject entirely from our philosophy any search for final causes.” Given his admiration for Newtonian mechanics one would expect Kant to follow Descartes’ mechanistic view of nature in this respect. However, Kant thoroughly recognizes that the purely mechanical principles of nature will not ground the purposiveness of organisms (KU, 516). He also recognizes that the power of judgment picks up on final causes in nature as it does in works of art. Both have to do with Technik (KU, pp. 212-213). He further draws an analogy between the way purpose is involved in the artist’s effort to produce the work of art and the purposefulness built into nature (by the divine Artificer, KU, p. 222). Though in the course of his investigation this analogy will break down in the end. Finally, tying up the notion of purposiveness built into (human) nature and moral action, Kant notes that while in the sphere of practical reason there is a definite purposiveness to inclination, it is something that, at least in morality, freedom is supposed to counter (KU, p. 208).

As with the judgment of taste, the power of judgment relative to purposefulness (Behuf) in nature is not in the object but in the subject. However, as with the aesthetic judgment of beauty or the sublime, Kant is not willing to leave the matter simply at that. He also wishes to provide some sort of objective basis for such judgments.

He uses two different criteria to determine purposiveness. Something in nature will count as having a built-in end or purpose if it is both cause and effect of itself (KU, p. 482), like trees reproducing themselves. Or, if it is something, as in a physical organism, that is reciprocally both means and end (KU, p. 488). Indeed, according to Kant one has a vague idea (Ahnung) of final causes in nature, and nature sometimes provides a hint (Wink) for such a regulative or heuristic idea (KU, p. 504). What Kant is saying here, I think, is that the idea of purpose in nature is based upon a purposive idea. Though again, he is not willing to leave the matter simply in the realm of subjectivity. As he says, purposiveness in nature is a subjective regulative idea as if (or as though, als ob) it were an objective one (KU, p. 522).

In the end, Kant concludes that it is not possible to get purposiveness in nature, intelligent design, if one will, as the intrinsic possibility of natural things without divine “art,” without an intelligent cause, that is, God (KU, pp. 513, 516).
However, the existence of such a world-cause, while it can (perhaps even must) be thought, strictly from the point of view of speculative reason it can be neither affirmed nor denied (KU, pp. 516-519). What Kant is saying is that intelligent design will not establish the existence of God. Rather the contrary: the existence of God must be presupposed in order to see intelligent design.

Kant is also careful to point out that in positing a supersensible (übersinnliche) cause, one must bear in mind that it would be a cause of a special sort. There is all the difference in the world, Kant insists, between the natural causality subsumed under a concept (of the understanding) and a “causality” subsumed under a supersensible idea, which übersinnliche Substrat der Natur we do not grasp (KU, pp. 531-534). The sort of causality involved in the mechanistic laws of nature and that of the supersensible substrate of nature are simply different (KU, p. 542). When it comes to the causality for worldly beings and for God, the analogy between the two just breaks down (KU, p. 594 n). There is no way one can get to the notion of an intelligent world-cause, as the ultimate Artist (höchsten Künstlers), from nature as a total ordered system (die gesamte Natur als System), since the latter is a totality (KU, pp. 561-562). It is no more than a regulative idea. There are obviously causal nexuses in nature. Nevertheless, the meaning of causality as it might be applied to the ultimate Artist would be as different as the causality of human moral freedom is different from causality in the phenomenal world. Again, all the analogies just break down.

Kant goes further. The “physical theology” of a First Cause will give only a Daimon (KU, pp. 570, 573). One may question whether such a cause even necessarily implies an intelligence; it is but a chimera (ein Unding, KU, p. 619). Further, it is quite unnecessary to go above and beyond the world (über die Welt hinaus zu gehen), as does “physical” theology, when there is the God of morality within (KU, p. 574). Not having succeeded in establishing a bridge between the first and second critiques by means of the aesthetic judgment or by means of the teleological judgment, at the end of the Critique of Judgment Kant basically returns to the position he had taken in the conclusion of the Critique of Practical Reason: he marvels at the starry skies above and the moral law within, above all the moral law within. Nevertheless, he is forced to concede that the bridge between these two marvels remains an issue outstanding. For Kant has carefully distinguished, not to say separated, the two worlds in which these two marvels obtain. There is the world that is grasped by the understanding (the starry skies above), a world of phenomena; and there is the world of the noumenal (God, freedom, etc.), the stays for the moral law within, which can only be thought, not known. Between these two worlds lies the chasm. A God that might bridge the chasm is not given in Kant. However, there is one other possible bridge offered in Kant, namely the “I” or the self that sees both the starry skies and “sees” the moral law. As he says, “I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my own existence.”12 Of course, we know—and Kant must surely suspect—that this is not going to work, since he is using the word “see” in two very different senses.
Nevertheless, toward the end of the *Critique of Judgment* Kant pursues this option. The human being, he says, is a link in the chain of natural purposes and also the entitled lord of nature as the ultimate end thereof (KU, p. 553). The human being is the ultimate end, goal and purpose of creation. However, he adds importantly, only in virtue of the fact that the human being is a moral entity (KU, p. 559 and n). One may recall what has been termed the second categorical imperative in Kant’s ethics: persons are to be treated as ends, never as means. Thus, there is a kingdom of ends with an all-knowing and all-powerful Primal Being (*Urwesen*) as its basis (KU, p. 569). Rational beings under the moral law can alone be thought of as the end, goal and purpose of the existence of the world. Hence, we are obliged to accept that there is a moral world cause, an Author of the world, namely God (KU, pp. 576-577). Nevertheless, reflective judgment relative to the moral proof for God’s existence, while it tends toward conviction, never quite reaches it (KU, pp. 592-593). Though he insists that even if one does not believe in God, one is still obliged to be moral (KU, pp. 578-579).

Kant’s move here is to the fourth question of the four basic questions stated in the introduction to his lectures on logic: What can I know? (Metaphysics); What ought I do? (Morality); What can I hope for? (Religion); and What is the human person? (Anthropology). Although Kant did, indeed, produce a work on anthropology (*Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, 1798), it is not at the level of critique and, thus, cannot really count as an answer to the famous fourth question regarding the meaning of the human person.

This implies that Kant’s suggestion of a connection between the two worlds through human consciousness only reveals that the chasm between the two worlds is an abyss. For in the same way that Kant is unable to bring together the ideal of pure reason, the unknowable God of speculative reason, and the postulated God of practical reason, so he is equally incapable of bridging the gap between the theoretical ego and the practical ego. The transcendental self of the first critique, the “I think” that is able to accompany my any and every representation, and the “I” of practical moral activity remain worlds apart. And for Kant there is no intellectual intuition that might possibly “see” how they would be joined together. Fichte will, of course, take serious issue with Kant on precisely this score. For Fichte there is an intellectual intuition. There has to be some direct intuition of the self’s own self-activity. In the *Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre*, he describes such an intellectual intuition as the immediate consciousness that I am acting, and what I am doing; it is that whereby I know something because I do it. On this issue, romantics such as Schlegel sided with Fichte rather than with Kant. One may recall his *Athenäumfragment* #76 cited above: “Intellectual intuition is the categorical imperative of (the) theory.”

There is, of course, the possible bridge of religion. However, it must always be born in mind that Kant’s understanding of faith or belief is that of a moral way of thinking on the part of reason in which one holds something to be true (*Fürwahrhalten*, KU, p. 603). Religion for Kant is, essentially, morality: religion is knowledge of our duty as a divine command (KU, p. 615). Such a narrowed, not to say crabbed, view of religion was hardly likely to appeal to the romantic soul. In one of his *Ideen*, #81, Schlegel maintains that every relation of
the human being to the Infinite, in the total fullness of his or her humanity, is religion. Schlegel’s understanding of religion would have struck Kant as a clear case of poetical exuberance. Further, Kant does not really approve of the “fullness” of totalities. Neither could he have abided Schlegel’s view that “the relation of the true artist or authentic human person relative to his or her ideal is thoroughgoing religion” (*Athenäumfragment* # 406).

When it comes to Kant’s fourth question, “What is the human person?”, Schlegel and Kant part company completely. Schlegel clearly prefers Fichte’s anthropology to that of Kant. As he says, “Imagine the finite in the Infinite and you think the human person.”16 The Infinite here is, of course, Fichte’s infinite or ideal self. But then how does this differ from Kant’s heuristic or regulative idea? I think the difference between the two is decisive. Kant’s idea may be purposive, or better, give rise to an appreciation of the purposive in nature. Fichte’s infinite, on the other hand, is an ideal, albeit for him an unattainable one. Further, Kant’s regulative ideas are, again, totalities, which I don’t think is the case with a Fichtean infinite or ideal self. For one thing it is a self, albeit an absolute one. Finally, Kant’s idea, that of a supersensible reality for example, is indeterminate; whereas Fichte’s infinite or ideal self is fiercely determinate. It has a certain definite content (*gewissen Gehalt*).17

One might be tempted to say that, in the end, the *Critique of Judgment* is a failed effort. Certainly, it would have seemed so to a romantic such as Schlegel. Or, damning with faint praise, one might say that Kant handles the problem well, having tied one hand behind his back. In whatever way one may view the work, it must be granted that much of importance is discovered and learned along the way. Indeed, many of the problems Kant exposes remain with philosophy today. For example, there is the question of intelligent design in the world. Kant insists that the meaning of causality as found in nature and the meaning of causality for a divine Artificer are very different. Indeed, any analogy between the two simply breaks down. By the same token, the meaning of freedom as exercised by the artist relative to the world and that exercised by the ultimate Artist would be equally *toto caelo* different.

There are basic problems in philosophy that simply do not, and will, go away.
Richard Kroner, “The Year 1800 and the Development of German Idealism,” *Review of Metaphysics*, 1 (1948-1949) 1-30. Special thanks are due to J. and K. Byron for twice reading over the manuscript and making many helpful suggestions for its improvement, and for checking the proofs.


In the first of the Athenaeum fragments, Schlegel observes “Nothing is more rarely the subject of philosophy than philosophy itself” (*Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde and the Fragments*, p. 161). Fichte, in Schlegel’s view, is one of those rare exceptions.

Indeed, according to René Wellek he was “one of the greatest critics of history.” *A History of Modern Criticism: 1750-1950*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955, II, 35.

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Kant distinguishes between the beautiful (schön) and the sublime (das Erhabene). The latter has to be big (KU, p. 333), or, at least, what seems relatively so to us (p. 335), transcending the senses (Sinne übertrifft, p. 336). It is a feeling relative to an idea, a totality (ein Ganzes) above and beyond our reach, toward which we have esteem (Achtung, p. 344). The beautiful, he says, pleases without interest; the sublime contrary to (gegen) interest (p. 357).


As stated clearly in the French, though not in the Latin, of the *Principles of Philosophy* I, 28.

*Werke in sechs Bänden*, IV, 300.

*Werke in sechs Bänden*, III, 448.

*Sämtliche Werke* I, 463.

Though one could also cite Novalis: “In der intellektualen Anschauung ist der Schlüssel des Lebens” (The key to life is found in the intellectual intuition). *Aus Vorarbeiten zu neuen Fragmentensammlungen*, VI, 168, *Deutsche Literatur*, Reihe 17: Romantik, Leipzig, 1931, p. 303, 21.


*Sämtliche Werke* I, 225.